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RASUL V. BUSH: A COURAGEOUS DECISION
BUT A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Sameh Mobarekt
I. Introduction
On September 11, 2001, terrorists flew three commercial airplanes into the
twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C.' A fourth plane, headed towards Washington, D.C., was de-
stroyed by the heroic acts of its passengers before it reached its destination-
likely saving many lives and avoiding further destruction to our nation's capital. 2
The nation watched this tragedy unfold on its television screens as almost 3,000
people lost their lives in New York alone.3 In response to the September 11 th
attacks, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President George W. Bush
to pursue those persons, organizations, or nations that had planned, authorized, or
aided in the attack.4 Pursuant to this authority, President Bush ordered the U.S.
military to commence military operations against al-Qaeda and its supporters, the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 5
During this campaign, the United States captured Taliban and al-Qaeda mem-
bers in Afghanistan and labeled them "enemy or unlawful combatants."'6 The
significance of such a designation was to deprive those captured of the "Prisoners
of War" status, and to leave the grant or denial of all the rights associated with
such designation under the Geneva Convention to the discretion of the Presi-
dent.7 The President also ordered that these prisoners be detained, either inside
t Associate, Jones Day; J.D., 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; M.B.A. Interna-
tional Finance, 1994, George Washington University; B.S. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
1991, George Washington University. I would like to thank my wife for her unwaivering support during
some difficult times, my parents for their encouragement and vision, and my daughter for giving my life
purpose.
1 Cable News Network, September 11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12, 2001), http://archives.cnn.
com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
2 Id.
3 British Broadcasting Corporation, A Nation's Pain and Loss (Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2255068.stm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
4 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001).
5 Steven Swanson, Enemy Combatant and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 939, 939
(2003).
6 Id. at 939-40.
7 See Guantanamo Bay-Camp X-Ray, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
guatanamo-bayx-ray.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). The Geneva Convention was developed by a
majority of states to govern the conduct of war after the tremendous suffering and bloodshed of two
World Wars. K. Elisabeth Dahlstrom, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multi-
lateralism 2001-2003; A Mid-Term Assessment: Humanitarian Law: The Executive Policy Toward De-
tention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 662, 663 (2003).
The Convention consists of four separate conventions each governing a distinct aspect of humanitarian
law including "the amelioration of the sick and wounded of the armed forces in the field; the amelioration
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or outside the United States, at locations designated by the Secretary of Defense. 8
Reportedly, 650 of these prisoners, representing as many as 33 nationalities, were
transferred to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they were
held without charge or trial for more than two years. 9 The prevailing government
view was that it could hold these prisoners at Guantanamo Bay indefinitely and
without access to any independent tribunal to review the facts leading to their
designation as enemy or unlawful combatants. 10
Rasul v. Bush1 represents the first attempt by any of these prisoners to chal-
lenge before the Supreme Court their continued detention. Part II of this article
discusses the background leading up to Rasul. Specifically, it discusses the re-
medial means available to prisoners to challenge their detention under U.S. law,
as well as case law applying these means to nonresident alien prisoners.12 Part
III explores the Court's decision in Rasul where it determined that nonresident
alien prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay do have the right to challenge their de-
tention through a writ of habeas corpus.13 Part IV analyzes the Court's holding,
as well as the dissenting opinion, and argues that, although the Court reached the
correct conclusion, it did not go far enough in determining the extent of the pris-
oners' rights under the Constitution. 14 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the
Court's ruling on changing the status of the prisoners' detention and on subse-
quent polices by the Executive in prosecuting the War on Terror. 15
II. Background
Under U.S. law a prisoner can challenge his or her detention by filing a writ of
habeas corpus.' 6 This writ traces its ancestry to early thirteenth century England
of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea; the treatment of prisoners of
war; and the treatment of civilian persons in time of war." Id.
8 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833-34 (Nov. 13, 2001). The order covered any non-citizen who (1) is or was a member of
al-Qaeda, (2) aided or assisted in any way in a terrorist act against the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy, or (3) knowingly harbored one or more persons described in (1) or
(2). Id.
9 Kim Barker, Kabul Frees 18 Held in Cuba; Ex-Guantanamo Inmates Go Home, CHI. TRIE., Mar.
26, 2003, at C 12; see also Roy Gutman & Sami Yousafzai, The Madman of Guantanamo, NEWSWEEK,
May 27, 2002, at 50.
10 Michael Sniffen, Details of Guantanamo Detention Emerge, AP, Dec. 29, 2004, available at http://
www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2004/12/29/detailsof-guantanamo-detentions_
emerge/ (last visited at Nov. 10, 2005) (noting that the government's position is that it can detain foreign-
ers who aided al Qaeda at Guantanamo Bay indefinitely even if such aid was unintentional or evidence of
it was obtained by torture).
11 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part V.
16 Swanson, supra note 5, at 945 (quoting Justice Story as explaining that the writ is "justly esteemed
the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person
is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of
detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge").
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where it was used to ensure that a party to a suit appeared before the court. 17 It
was eventually adopted by the American colonies and was reflected in the Con-
stitutional provision that prohibited Congress from passing any laws that might
abridge one's right to file the writ. 18 Originally, the writ was limited to cases of
federal prisoners held in state facilities, but the Judiciary Act of 1789 expanded
its scope to apply to prisoners held in federal facilities.' 9 Subsequently, the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 expanded the writ's scope even further by granting
federal courts the authority to hear a prisoner's appeal where his or her detention
was in violation of either the Constitution or U.S. law.2 0
This Part discusses 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (hereinafter referred to as "§ 2241" or
the "Habeas Statute") governing the grant of the writ as well as some of the
historical context in which it has developed. 21 Although case law addressing
enemy combatants' access to the writ is sparse, 2 2 this Part discusses three of the
seminal cases dealing with the issuance of the writ to this class of prisoners.23 As
will be noted, the Court seems to draw a bright line in such an application, based
on whether the detention was inside or outside the territorial sovereignty of the
United States.24 As such, this Part explores the history of Guantanamo Bay and
the determination of U.S. sovereignty over the territory.25
A. The Habeas Corpus Statute - 28 U.S.C. § 2241
In 1867, Congress expanded the federal courts' authority to hear habeas
corpus appeals by granting the courts the authority to hear such appeals in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty.2 6 This language
is the direct ancestor of the current 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) ("§ 2241(c)(3)"). 27 In
addition, Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) ("§ 2241(a)"), limiting the grant
of the writ by federal district and circuit judges to their respective jurisdictions. 28
This language reflected a congressional compromise satisfying concerns voiced
17 Id. at 946.
18 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that "the privilege of the writ shall not be suspended");
see also Swanson, supra note 5, at 946.
19 Swanson, supra note 5, at 946.
20 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996). Until Congress expanded the scope of the federal
court's power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, the court's power was limited, by Section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, to granting the writ to prisoners in custody, under or by color of the authority of
the United States, or who were committed for trial before some federal court. Id.
21 See infra Part I.A.
22 Swanson, supra note 5, at 947.
23 See infra Part .B.
24 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Eisentrager opinion).
25 See infra Part II.C.
26 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2004) (stating that a prisoner has the right to habeas appeal if "[h]e is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
28 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2004) (stating that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions").
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by Senator Johnson at the time of the statute's enactment. 29 Senator Johnson was
troubled that the statute's broad grant of power to issue the writ may give federal
judges the right to assert authority over jailers in remote districts, even if such
districts were outside the territorial reach of the issuing court. 30 To address this
concern, Senator Trumbull, the statute's sponsor, added the words "within their
respective jurisdictions" to circumscribe the courts' authority to issue the writ.31
This language survived several amendments to the statute over the years and is
still reflected in § 2241(a) as language similar to that introduced by Senator
Trumbull. 32
B. Jurisdictional Limitations on Habeas Appeals
Over the years, the meaning of this jurisdictional limitation was the subject of
much attention by the Court.33 Traditionally, as the Court found in Ahrens v.
Clark, federal courts could not assert in personem jurisdiction over a habeas ap-
peal unless both the prisoner and custodian were physically within the court's
territory. 34 This decision was heavily criticized as impractical and not compelled
by the express language of the Habeas Statute. 35 The Court then decided John-
son v. Eisentrager,36 holding that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear
the habeas appeals of enemy aliens who lacked any connection to the United
States beyond their capture, trial, and subsequent incarceration. 37 Eisentrager
was decided largely based on the authority of Ahrens, although the Court went to
great lengths to discuss the limitations on the extraterritorial application of the
protections of the Bill of Rights to nonresident aliens. 38 Finally, in Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky. ,39 the Court created an exception to Ahrens by
finding jurisdiction to issue the writ for a prisoner who was physically outside the
29 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 204 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
30 Id. Senator Johnson was responding to the original language of the bill which stated "[t]hat the
several courts of the United States and the several justices and judges of such courts, in addition to the
authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law
of the United States .. ." Id. at 205. This language was criticized on the grounds that "it would permit a
district judge in Florida to bring before him some men convicted and sentenced and held under imprison-
ment in the State of Vermont or in any of the further States." Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 496 (1973).
31 Braden, 410 U.S. at 496.
32 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2004).
33 See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Ahrens opinion); see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the
Eisentrager opinion); Part IU.B.3 (discussing the Braden opinion).
34 See Megan A. Ferstenfeld-Torres, Who are We to Name? The Applicability of the "Immediate-
Custodian-as-Respondent" Rule to Alien Habeas Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
431, 435 (2003); see also infra Part Il.B.1 (discussing the Ahrens opinion).
35 Ferstenfeld-Torres, supra note 34, at 436.
36 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
37 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Eisentrager opinion).
38 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Eisentrager opinion).
39 Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
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court's territory.40 The Court held that Ahrens's reliance on the language of the
Habeas Statute, which required the physical presence of both the prisoner and the
custodian within a court's territory as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, was mis-
placed.4 1 At least within the context of Braden's facts, the Court concluded that
jurisdiction over the custodian alone was sufficient to find jurisdiction to grant
the writ.42
1. Ahrens v. Clark4 3
In Ahrens, the Court considered whether a prisoner must be located within the
territorial jurisdiction of a federal court to invoke that court's power to issue the
writ of habeas corpus.44 The petitioners were 120 German citizens who were
held at Ellis Island, New York, for deportation back to Germany.4 5 Their depor-
tation was ordered by the Attorney General upon a determination that they were
dangerous to the public and safety of the United States.46 The Attorney General
drew his authority from Presidential Proclamation 2655 of July 14, 1945, pursu-
ant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798. 4 7
The petitioners filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District of
Columbia's district court challenging the Attorney General's authority to order
their removal. 48 The petitioners argued that the Attorney General lacked the stat-
utory authority to effect such removal because actual hostilities with Germany
had ceased. 49 The government moved to dismiss the petition because the peti-
tioners were detained in New York, thus they were outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a court sitting in the District of Columbia. 50 The district court granted the
government's motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") affirmed the decision.5 1
40 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Braden opinion).
41 Ferstenfeld-Torres, supra note 34, at 436; see also infra Part 11.B.3 (discussing the Braden
opinion).
42 See infra Part 1l.B.3 (discussing the Braden opinion).
43 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
44 Id. at 189.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. The predecessor of § 2241 was 28 U.S.C. § 452, in effect at the time of the Ahrens decision,
which provided:
The several justices of the Supreme Court and the several judges of the circuit courts of appeal
and of the district courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty. A circuit judge
shall have the same power to grant writs of habeas corpus within his circuit, that a district judge
has within his district.
28 U.S.C. § 452 (1940).
49 Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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The Supreme Court first noted that the jurisdictional limitation on federal
courts' power to issue the writ was a matter of first impression. 52 The Court also
stated that as a matter of legal principle the federal district courts' jurisdiction
was territorial unless Congress expressly created an exception to extend such
jurisdiction.5 3 As such, the Court reasoned that the presence of a jailer within a
district court's jurisdiction was not, by itself, sufficient to establish that court's
jurisdiction over that jailer's prisoner.54 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that
the Habeas Statute contemplated procedures which may require the appearance
of a petitioner before the court.55 In the case of a prisoner, this requirement may
involve significant travel and administrative expenses, as well as a risk of escape
if the prisoner is being transported from remote locations, perhaps thousands of
miles from the court's location.56 The Court also discussed the legislative history
associated with the Habeas Statute and found that Congress was primarily con-
cerned with circumscribing the federal courts' territorial jurisdiction to issue the
writ.57 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress could not have contemplated
such a requirement if it intended to extend the courts' jurisdiction to issue the
writ beyond its territorial limits. 58 Therefore, the Court held that the district
court sitting in the District of Columbia did not have jurisdiction to hear a habeas
appeal from a petitioner located in New York. 59
Justice Rutledge, with whom Justices Black and Murphy joined, dissented.60
Justice Rutledge noted that the Court's holding essentially elevated the place of
physical custody to the level of exclusive jurisdictional criteria when one applies
the Habeas Statute.61 He found that such a restriction greatly contracted the
writ's historical scope and was contrary to the Court's own precedent. 62 He fur-
ther found that the Court had already determined that jurisdiction over the jailer,
52 Id. at 190.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 190-91.
56 Id. at 191.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 193. However, the Court expressly noted that its holding did not "determine the question of
what process, if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may
employ to assert federal rights." Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 196.
62 Id. at 195. To highlight his concerns, Justice Rutledge asked:
For if the absence of the body from the jurisdiction is alone conclusive against the existence of
power to issue the writ, what of the case where the place of imprisonment, whether by private or
public action, is unknown? What also of the situation where that place is located in one district,
but the jailer is present and can be served with process only in another? And if the place of
detention lies wholly outside the territorial limits of any federal jurisdiction, although the person
or persons exercising restraint are clearly within reach of such authority, is there to be no rem-
edy, even though it is American citizens who are wrongfully deprived of their liberty and Ameri-
cans answerable to no other power who deprive them of it, whether purporting to act officially or
otherwise?
Id.
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and not the prisoner, was controlling in ascertaining a particular court's jurisdic-
tion to issue the writ.63 In addition, Justice Rutledge noted that the legislative
history of the Habeas Statute, while suggesting clear congressional intent to limit
the scope of federal courts to issue the writ, did not indicate that Congress in-
tended to limit a court's personal jurisdiction to its territorial limits. 64 Thus, he
found no support for the Court's conclusion that the absence of a prisoner from
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was fatal to that court's ability to issue the
writ even when the court had such jurisdiction over the jailer.65
2. Johnson v. Eisentrager66
In Eisentrager, the Court was asked to determine whether federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals filed by enemy aliens detained by the U.S.
military outside the sovereign territory of the United States. 67 The petitioners in
this case were twenty-one German nationals captured in China by the U.S. mili-
tary after the Japanese surrendered at the end of the Second World War.68 They
were charged with violating the laws of war by engaging in, permitting, or order-
ing continued military activity against the United States after the surrender of
Germany and before the surrender of Japan. 6 9 They were tried and convicted by
a military commission instituted in China by the Commanding General of the
United States Forces, China Theater, pursuant to the authority granted by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. 70  After their convictions, their
sentences were reviewed and approved by a military reviewing authority and the
petitioners were then transported to a prison under the control of the U.S. Army
in Landsberg, Germany to serve out their sentences. 71
The prisoners petitioned the district court in the District of Columbia for a writ
of habeas corpus challenging their detention. 72 The prisoners alleged that they
were civilian contractors working for the German government when they were
captured. 73 As such, they claimed that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment
by the U.S. military violated, inter alia, Articles I and HI of the U.S. Constitution
as well as the Fifth Amendment.74 Relying on Ahrens, the district court dis-
63 Id. at 196-97; see also Ex parte Endo 323 U.S. 283, 306 (1944) noting that:
[t]here are expressions in some of the cases which indicate that the place of confinement must be
within the court's territorial jurisdiction in order to enable it to issue the writ. But we are of the
view that the court may act if there is a respondent within reach of its process who has custody of
the petitioner (internal citations omitted).
64 Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 205.
65 Id. at 206.
66 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
67 Id. at 765.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 766.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 765.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 767.
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missed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, causing the prisoners to appeal to the
D.C. Circuit. 75
In considering the appeal, the D.C. Circuit distilled the case down to three
main issues: (1) whether the prisoners were entitled to the writ as a matter of
substantive law; (2) if so, whether the Habeas Statute divested them of that right;
and (3) if they were entitled to that right, which court had jurisdiction to hear the
habeas petition.76
To answer these questions, the court resorted to the fundamental principles
underlying the Constitution.77 First, the court reasoned that the Fifth Amend-
ment's protections extended to any person and not just to American citizens.78
By implication, the court reasoned that the protections of the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause extended to enemy aliens deprived of life, liberty, or property
by official action under the color of U.S. law.79 In other words, since the Fifth
Amendment acted as a limitation on the conduct of the federal government, the
only jurisdictional nexus required to extend Fifth Amendment protections was an
action by the federal government, irrespective of the status or location of the
persons upon whom this action operated. 80 Furthermore, since the writ of habeas
corpus was the best defense of personal freedom, the use of the writ to challenge
violations of the Fifth Amendment was indispensable. 81
Second, the court reasoned that Congress' power to suspend the writ was lim-
ited to times of rebellion or invasion when public safety may require it.82 If the
Habeas Statute was interpreted to condition the application of the writ on court
jurisdiction, such a limitation, if interpreted within the rubric of Ahrens, could
operate to deny an American citizen's access to a habeas appeal simply because
he or she may be held by the U.S. government outside the jurisdiction of any
federal court. 83 Since Congress was not empowered by the Constitution to effect
75 Id.
76 Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
77 Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 963.
78 Id. Although the D.C. Circuit did not expressly indicate which provision of the Fifth Amendment
was implicated by the case, it is reasonable to assume that the court impliedly relied on the Fifth Amend-
ment's due process clause to support its holding. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no "person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
79 Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 964 (noting that the "constitutional prohibitions apply directly to acts of
Government, or Government officials, and are not conditioned upon persons or territory").
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it"); see
also Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 965.
83 Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 964. The D.C. Circuit seems to be echoing Justice Rutledge's concern in
his dissent in Ahrens, namely that a geographical limitation on the application of the writ could operate to
deny it to those entitled to its protection under the Constitution. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 195
(1984).
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such a deprivation, the court reasoned that the Habeas Statute must be interpreted
to allow such access or impliedly be rendered unconstitutional. 84
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that when a person was outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any district court and deprived of his or her liberty by
official action of the U.S. government, that person's habeas petition would lie in
the district court which had territorial jurisdiction over the officials with directive
power over the immediate jailer.85
The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's decision and reversed.
Justice Jackson, in his opinion for the majority, noted that the Court had been at
pains to point out that extending constitutional protections to aliens depended on
the aliens' presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.86 Even
when such jurisdiction was found, those protections could be further circum-
scribed by the status of the alien.87 For example, if the alien was a citizen of a
country with which the United States was at war, the alien could be constitution-
ally subject to summary arrest, internment, and deportation. 88 In such a case,
courts would entertain challenges to the detention of that person by the U.S.
government only to the extent necessary to ascertain the existence of a state of
war or to determine whether he or she was an enemy alien.89 Once these juris-
dictional elements were established, courts would not inquire further into intern-
ment issues.90 Deprivation of other constitutional protections afforded to aliens
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States would thus be a temporary
incident of war and not an incident of alienage.91
However, in the case of an enemy alien located outside U.S. territorial juris-
diction that remained in the service of the enemy, Justice Jackson reasoned that
even this limited review was unavailable. 92 He noted that it was a well-estab-
lished common law tradition that a nonresident enemy alien could not maintain
an action in the courts of a country with which his country of residence main-
tained a state of war.93 This principle was borne out of the practical considera-
84 Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 964. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the other solution would be to interpret
the statute as requiring a distinction in its application between American citizens and aliens. Id. The
court impliedly rejected this approach finding that the writ of habeas corpus was deeply rooted in a
common law tradition that used the writ to test the authority of one who deprives another of his liberty.
See Id.
85 Id. at 967.
86 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 775.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 772.
92 Id. at 776; see also Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1946). The prisoners argued that they should be, at least, granted review based on the Court's decisions
in Quirin and Yamashita where the habeas petitions of nonresident enemy aliens were reviewed but
denied on the merit. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779. Justice Jackson distinguished both Quirin and
Yamashita by noting that, in both cases, the petitioners were within the territorial jurisdiction of Ameri-
can courts. Id. at 780.
93 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776.
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tions that such access could hamper the war efforts and give aid to the enemy.94
As such, Justice Jackson found the fact that the prisoners in this case were (1)
nonresident enemy aliens (2) captured and held as prisoners-of-war outside the
United States, (3) tried for crimes committed outside the United States, and (4)
remained at all times afterwards outside of the United States, to be
determinative. 95
Furthermore, Justice Jackson found the D.C. Circuit's broad application of the
Fifth Amendment to the Eisentrager prisoners to be untenable. 96 He reasoned
that if the Fifth Amendment's use of "any person" could be construed to extend
Fifth Amendment protections to nonresident enemy aliens, such interpretation
would extend more protections to enemy aliens than available to American
soldiers in time of war. 97 Moreover, if the term "any person" in the Fifth
Amendment was interpreted so expansively, then the Sixth Amendment's use of
"accused" would logically extend the Sixth Amendment to enemy aliens as
well. 98 For that matter, because the civil-rights amendments were similarly un-
limited by territory or person, courts would have to extend to enemy aliens the
First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech, religion, press, and assem-
bly; the Second Amendment's right to bear arms; the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment's right to jury trials.99 In short, Justice Jackson flatly rejected such
expansion and found that the Fifth Amendment did not confer any rights onto the
Eisentrager prisoners.100
Accordingly, Justice Jackson concluded that the prisoners did not have the
right to a habeas appeal.10 1 He concluded that the prisoners did not have a con-
stitutional right to access federal courts; thus, there was no need to determine
where such access could be had. 10
2
94 Id.
95 Id. at 777.
96 Id. at 782.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger") (empha-
sis added); see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783.
98 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 782.
99 Id. at 784.
100 Justice Jackson's opinion for the majority of the Court seems to have considered the extent of an
alien's rights under the Constitution as dependant first upon the alien's presence in the United States as a
threshold matter and second on the duration of this presence. He stated:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights;
they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to
become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.
Id. at 770.
I01 Id. at 790-91.
102 Id. at 791.
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Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and Burton joined, dissented pri-
marily for three reasons. 103 First, he noted that the gravamen of the Court's
majority opinion was based on the conclusion that the prisoners were nonresident
enemy aliens, in the service of an enemy, and in violation of the laws of war.10 4
However, he argued that the prisoners alleged enough facts to raise doubt as to
the conclusion that they violated the laws of war. 105 Irrespective, he noted that
the only question presented to the Court was limited to jurisdiction and not to the
validity or sufficiency of the pleadings with respect to the relevant facts, which
the district court never reached or considered. 106
Second, Justice Black reasoned that the question whether enemy combatants
could contest trial and conviction for war crimes by habeas appeal was addressed
twice by the Court in Ex parte Quirin10 7 and Yamashita v. United States.108 He
noted that, in Quirin, the Court held that the designation of "enemy combatant"
did not foreclose consideration by the courts of a prisoner's claim that his or her
detention was in violation of the Constitution or U.S. law. 10 9 It was only after
the Court upheld jurisdiction to consider the prisoner's habeas appeal that the
Court denied the appeal on the merits." 0 Similarly, in Yamashita, the Court
determined that a Japanese general tried and convicted for war crimes after hos-
tilities with Japan at the end of the Second World War had the right to challenge
the authority of the military tribunals determining such conviction."' Thus, Jus-
tice Black concluded that the status of the Eisentrager prisoners as enemy com-
batants was not, by itself, sufficient to deny them access to courts through habeas
appeals. 112
Third, Justice Black noted that the Court's majority opinion did not deny that
if the prisoners were held within the United States, there would be no question as
to the courts' jurisdiction to hear challenges to the prisoners detention through
habeas appeal. 113 He also noted that, although the prisoners in both Quirin and
Yamashita were held as prisoners in the United States or territories under the
control and authority of the United States, the Court's decisions in both cases did
103 Id. (Black, J. dissenting).
"04 Id. at 792-93.
105 Id. at 793.
106 Id. at 792.
107 Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
108 Id. (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).
109 Id. (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25).
i10 Id. (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48).
III Id. 794 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9). In Yamashita, the Supreme Court affirmed its ruling in
Quirin and held that the fact that Congress sanctioned trials of enemy combatants by military commis-
sions indicated that Congress recognized the accused's right to a defense, and, thus, the Executive branch
could not deny the courts' power to review the authority of these commissions. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at
9. At the same time, the Court also noted that the commission's rulings on evidence and on the mode of
conduct of the proceedings against an enemy combatant were reviewable by the appropriate military
reviewing authority and not the courts. Id. at 23.
112 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795.
1"3 Id.
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not rely on any territorial nexus.1 14 Thus, he concluded that the majority's opin-
ion in Eisentrager fashioned a dangerous rule that could allow the Executive to
deprive all federal courts of their power to protect against illegal incarcerations
simply by deciding where federal prisoners would be tried and imprisoned. 115
3. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky116
In Braden, the Supreme Court revisited its interpretation in Ahrens of the juris-
dictional limitations on federal courts' authority to hear habeas appeals. In this
case, Braden was serving a sentence in an Alabama prison.' 17 Prior to his arrest
and conviction in Alabama, he was indicted for storehouse breaking and safe-
breaking in a Kentucky court on facts unrelated to his crimes in Alabama." l8
However, since the Kentucky indictment was likely to prejudice his opportunity
for parole from his Alabama prison, Braden demanded that his trial in Kentucky
proceed. 119 When Kentucky refused, he filed a habeas appeal with the federal
district court sitting in the Western District of Kentucky alleging that Kentucky's
refusal violated his constitutional right for a speedy trial.' 20 The district court
granted the petition and held that Kentucky must arrange for Braden's return to
the state to stand trial on the charges against him. 121 On appeal, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reluctantly reversed, recognizing that its decision
may result in Braden being denied a forum in which to assert his constitutional
claim. 122
The Supreme Court noted that developments since Ahrens raised serious ques-
tions as to the continued vitality of that decision. 123 The Court further noted that
Ahrens was predicated on the view that the expenses and risks associated with
the production of prisoners from remote locations before the issuing court were
of paramount concern to Congress when it imposed a jurisdictional limit on the
power of federal courts to issue the writ. 124 However, the Court found that Con-
gress had since amended the Habeas Statute in such a way as to indicate that
these concerns were no longer valid. 125 For example, Congress allowed collat-
eral attacks on federal sentences to be brought in the sentencing court rather than
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
117 Id. at 485.
118 Id. at 486.
119 Id. at 487.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. Pursuant to the Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in effect at the time and
where Braden was incarcerated, he could only file a habeas appeal in the district court sitting in the state
that filed the challenged indictment. Id. at 488. In other words, Braden could not file his appeal in a
federal district court in Alabama because he was challenging an indictment issued by Kentucky.
123 Id. at 497.
124 Id. at 496.
125 Id. at 497.
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the district in which the prisoner was incarcerated.1 26 Congress also allowed a
prisoner convicted in state court in a state with two or more federal districts to
challenge his conviction on federal habeas grounds in either the district court of
his confinement or his conviction, if different.127 The Court also noted that in
Burns v. Wilson, 128 it implicitly held that an American citizen held outside the
territory of any district court could not be denied habeas relief. 129 Thus, the
Court concluded that Ahrens should not be viewed as instituting a rigid jurisdic-
tional rule requiring a choice of an inconvenient forum, even in a class of cases
the Court did not consider when it decided Ahrens. 130
Instead, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus did not act on the pris-
oner who sought relief.131 Rather, the writ acted upon the custodian responsible
for the challenged detention.1 32 The Court further reasoned that § 2241(a), when
read literally, required nothing more than the issuing court having jurisdiction
over the custodian. 133 In other words, so long as the custodian can be reached by
process, a federal court could properly issue the writ "within its jurisdiction"
under § 2241(a).134
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 498 (citing Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), reh'g denied, 346 U.S. 844, 851-52
(1953)). In Bums, the Supreme Court considered denial of habeas appeal to American citizens convicted
by a military court-martial on the Island of Guam for murder and rape. Bums, 346 U.S. at 138. In
considering the prisoners' appeal, the Court stated that the
statute which vests federal courts with jurisdiction over applications for habeas corpus from
persons confined by the military courts is the same statute which vests them with jurisdiction
over the applications of persons confined by the civil courts. But in military habeas corpus the
inquiry, the scope of matters open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil cases.
Id. at 139. In his opinion denying rehearing, Justice Frankfurter noted that while the Court's opinion in
the case spoke only of jurisdiction as the proper scope of review, the Court had reviewed decisions by
military commissions for procedural errors in the past. Id. at 846. Thus, he concluded that the scope of
review of military commissions actually extended beyond geographic jurisdiction and into the constitu-
tional underpinnings necessary for legitimacy of the commission's decision. Id.
129 Id. at 498.
130 Id. at 499-500. The Court noted that, in Ahrens, there was no indication why the district court
sitting in the District of Columbia was more convenient than the district court sitting in the Eastern
District of New York or why the government should be required to incur the expense of transporting 120
detainees from New York to the District of Columbia for the hearings. Id. at 500. Without reasonable
justification, the rule remained that the proper venue in such a case was the Eastern District of New York
as decided by the Court at the time. Id.
131 Braden, 410 U.S. at 494.
132 Id. at 495-96 (citing In re Jackson, 114 U.S. 564 (1885)), quoted with approval in Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283, 306 (1944):
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is
directed to, and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailer. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors,
and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent.
133 Braden, 410 U.S. at 495; see also Endo, 323 U.S. at 306 (noting that the writ of habeas corpus
may be issued by a court that could reach a respondent who was custodian of the prisoner petitioning for
such relief).
134 Braden, 410 U.S. at 495
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Consequently, the Court held that because Alabama, as custodian, could be
considered Kentucky's agent, and because Kentucky was within the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court sitting in Kentucky, the federal court in Kentucky
had jurisdiction to hear Braden's habeas appeal.1 35
C. Extent of Constitutional Protections Afforded to Aliens
One of the key issues involved in aliens' access to habeas appeal is the extra-
territorial scope of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It is of little conse-
quence that an alien prisoner can petition the courts for a writ of habeas corpus if
that prisoner has no rights, save the right to the appeal itself, that the court could
enforce. Because the writ allows a prisoner to challenge his or her detention as a
violation of the Constitution or U.S. laws, it would be illogical to argue that a
right to the writ existed when the Constitution and U.S. law did not confer to
such prisoner any right in the first place. This is precisely the point that Justice
Jackson made in his majority opinion in Eisentrager with respect to alien ene-
mies outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on the extraterritoriality of constitu-
tional protections are instructive, though not definitive. 136 However, it is well
settled that the Constitution is the basis for federal government authority.1 37
Thus, the government cannot act beyond its Constitutional authority and the limi-
tations imposed upon it.138 In other words, the question at issue in determining
constitutional extraterritoriality is the interpretation of the individual provisions
and the determination of their application in particular situations.1 39
In Reid v. Covert,140 the Supreme Court considered whether American citizens
tried and convicted by a military court-martial overseas had the right to a trial by
jury as mandated by the Fifth 14' and Sixth Amendments.1 42 The Court first
135 Id. at 498-99.
136 See Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. REv. 1, 44 (2004) (noting
that the Supreme Court's previous pronouncements on the extraterritorial application of constitutional
rights may not be conclusive in the case of prisoners held within the context of military action).
137 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitu-
tion. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution."); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes.").
138 Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitu-
tion 'does not apply' overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily
apply in all circumstances in every foreign place."); see also Neuman, supra note 136, at 45. Justice
Harlan argued that constitutional protections should not be considered to automatically protect Ameri-
cans overseas. Reid, 354 U.S. at 74. Rather, factors of practicality and reasonableness must be consid-
ered when ascertaining which constitutional rights afforded by the Constitution could be extended to
protect Americans in anomalous situations overseas. Id.
139 Neuman, supra note 136, at 45.
140 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142 U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
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noted that the language of the Constitution must be given its plain meaning, un-
less the language was unclear and ambiguous. 143 The Court also noted that the
Constitution required criminal trials to be by jury and to be held within the state
in which the crime had been committed or, when the crime was not committed
within a state, in a place directed by Congress. 144 The Court reasoned that jury
trials and indictment procedures were enshrined in the Constitution to protect
their abridgement for expediency or convenience. 145 The Court rejected the no-
tion that a treaty with a foreign country could give the Executive branch the
authority to ignore the mandates of the Constitution with respect to conduct
within the treaty's scope.' 46 While the Constitution gave Congress the power to
authorize the trial of members of the military without all the constitutional safe-
guards given an accused, this power did not extend to civilians. 147 Thus, the
Court concluded that the Constitution in its entirety does apply to American citi-
zens held outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction. 148
But the Court was more circumspect when extending constitutional protections
to aliens subject to actions by the United States overseas. In United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extended to an alien
overseas. 149 The defendant-alien involved was a Mexican citizen and resident
believed to be the leader of an organization that smuggled narcotics into the
United States. 150 Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") obtained a
warrant for his arrest and, with the help of Mexican authorities, apprehended him
in Mexico, and moved him to the United States where he was formally ar-
rested.1 51  Subsequently, DEA agents, in association with Mexican police,
searched the defendant's residence in Mexico without any judicial authoriza-
tion. 152 The defendant motioned the court to suppress the evidence discovered in
his residence as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and, as such, excluded by
operation of the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine. 153 The district court granted
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
143 Covert, 354 U.S. at 8 n.7; see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731-32 (1931):
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear
there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.... The fact that an
instrument drawn with such meticulous care and by men who so well understood how to make
language fit their thought does not contain any such limiting phrase ... is persuasive evidence
that no qualification was intended.
144 Reid, 354 U.S. at 7 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 3).
145 Id. at 10.
146 Id. at 16-18.
147 Id. at 19-21.
148 Id. at 21.
149 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
150 Id. at 262.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 263.
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the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that
decision. 154
In a sharply divided 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court noted that the Fourth
Amendment, like the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, used the term
"the people" as the object of its protections as opposed to "persons" or "accused"
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 55 The Court reasoned that such terms re-
ferred to a class of persons who were part of a national community or have
otherwise developed a sufficient connection with the country considered to be
part of that community. 156 The Court also found that such a conclusion was
supported by the history of the Fourth Amendment's drafting, which suggested
that the framers intended it to be limited to domestic matters within the United
States. 157 Thus, the Court concluded that Fourth Amendment protections did not
extend to nonresident aliens overseas.1 58
However, the Court's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez was more sweeping than
its holding may initially convey. In concluding that Fourth Amendment protec-
tions did not extend to aliens, the Court analogized the operation of the Fourth
Amendment to that of the Fifth Amendment in Eisentrager 59 The Court rea-
soned that Eisentrager stood for the proposition that Fifth Amendment protec-
tions do not extend to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.' 60 The Court also narrowly interpreted its holding in Reid and found that
it applied only to American citizens stationed abroad. 16
Justice Kennedy, who supplied the crucial fifth vote for the majority in
Verdugo-Urquidez, argued for a different approach.1 62 He advocated the ap-
proach adopted by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid, and disagreed
that there was an express, textual limitation on the scope of the constitutional
protections in the Bill of Rights.1 63 Instead, he reasoned that the extraterritorial
extension of the Bill of Rights should be determined based on a contextual analy-
sis of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 164 Only where the adop-
tion of a particular right in the Bill of Rights proved to be impracticable and
anomalous should it be held inapplicable to government action overseas.165 Be-
cause Justice Kennedy considered the application of the Fourth Amendment's
154 Id.
155 Id. at 265 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV, stating that "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
156 Id.
'57 Id. at 266.
158 Id. at 273-75.
'59 Id. at 269.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 270.
162 Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id.; see also discussion in supra note 138.
164 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278; see also Neuman, supra note 136, at 46.
165 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278; see also Neuman, supra note 136, at 46.
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in Verdugo-Urquidez to
be impracticable and anomalous, he agreed with the majority's conclusion. 166
D. The Status of the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1. History
In 1898, a battalion of U.S. Marines were stationed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
as part of the war with Spain. 167 On March 2, 1901, Congress enacted a law
authorizing the President to buy or lease land from the government of the Repub-
lic of Cuba ("Cuba") to establish a naval station in that country. 168 In imple-
menting this mandate, the President entered into two lease agreements and a
treaty over 33 years.169
The first agreement, signed on February 16, 1903, involved both the lease of
specifically identified areas to be used for the base and the granting of rights to
the adjacent water and waterways. 170 The base was expressly limited to coaling
or naval stations only, and for no other purpose.171 The agreement also acknowl-
edged the continued ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over the leased land, but stipu-
lated that the United States had complete jurisdiction and control over the area
during the term of the lease. 172
The second agreement was signed on July 2, 1903.173 This agreement pro-
vided that the United States would pay Cuba the sum of 2,000 gold coins every
year as payment for the leased land and water rights. 174 It also provided that any
fugitives from Cuban law taking refuge in the base would be delivered by the
United States to Cuban authorities upon demand; likewise, any fugitives from
U.S. law taking refuge in Cuba would be delivered by Cuba to U.S. authorities
upon demand. 175
The foregoing agreements were further modified by a treaty signed between
the United States and Cuba on May 29, 1934.176 This treaty provided that the
166 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278.
167 Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 340 n.2 (D. Conn. 1996).
168 M.E. MURPHY, THE HISTORY OF GuANTANAMo BAY, Chapter HI (U.S. Naval Base, District Publi-
cations and Printing Office Tenth Naval Dist. 1953). Specifically, the law stated:
That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people
thereof, as well as its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States
lands necessary for coaling and Naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon by
the President of the United States.
Id. An appendix to the constitution of the Republic of Cuba promulgated on May 2, 1902, contained
identical language. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at Appendix D.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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two lease agreements would continue in full force and effect so long as (1) the
United States did not abandon its naval station on the leased land or (2) the
governments of the United States and Cuba agree to terminate the agreements. 177
2. The Legal Status of the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay
The Supreme Court never directly addressed the status of the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay before it faced the issue in Rasul v. Bush. 178 However, in Ver-
milya-Brown Co. v. Connell,179 the Supreme Court considered the collateral issue
of whether military bases overseas constitute U.S. possessions, and thus subject
to the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to tort claims arising from base
operations. The base at issue in the case involved a ninety-nine-year lease of
land in Bermuda that was recognized as the sovereign territory of the United
Kingdom. 180 The Court noted that, while recognizing that the determination of
sovereignty over an area was a political matter that should be left to the Execu-
tive and Legislative branches, it had authority to determine the status of prior
action by the government.1 81 The Court acknowledged that nothing in the case
caused it to differ from the Executive branch's determination that the lease in
question did not confer sovereignty to the United States over the leased land.1 82
However, the Court reasoned that Article IV, section 3, of the Constitution au-
thorized Congress to make all rules and regulations governing U.S. territory and
property. 183 The Court also noted that the lease agreement with the United King-
dom provided the United States with all the rights, power, and authority to affect
its control over the leased territory, thereby concluding that such authority did
not depend on sovereignty over the territory.1 8"
The Court then noted that the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
was at issue in the case, extended to any U.S. state, as well as the District of
Columbia, and to any U.S. territory or possession.1 85 The Court also noted that
the term "possession" included Puerto Rico, Guam, the Guano Islands, Samoa,
and the Virgin Islands.1 86 Thus, the Court reasoned that it was logical to expect
177 Id.
178 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
179 Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
180 Id. at 378-79; see also Seth J. Hawkins, Up Guantanamo Without a Paddle: Waves of Afghan
Detainees Drown in America's Great Habeas Loophole, 47 ST. Louis L.J. 1243, 1255 (2003) (noting that
the terms of the lease involved in Vermilya-Brown resembled leases for military bases in the Philippines,
Panama, and Guantanamo).
181 Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 380.
182 Id.; see also Hawkins, supra note 180, at 1255 (noting that the Court in Vermilya-Brown rejected
that notion that the terms "all rights, power, and authority" in a lease agreement gave the United States
sovereignty over the leased land).
183 Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 381 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.).
184 Id. at 383. The Court also noted that such provision was similar to provisions in other lease
agreements signed by the United States for military bases overseas, including the lease agreement with
Cuba for Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 383-84.
185 Id. at 379.
186 Id. at 388.
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that the term "possession" also included areas vital to our national interest where
the United States had sole power, such as the naval base in Bermuda., 87 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act extended to
the base.1 88
In Cuban American Bar Association v. Christopher,189 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit directly considered the status of the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay when it was asked to determine the rights of Cuban and Haitian
refugees held at the base. 190 The Eleventh Circuit found, just as the Supreme
Court did in Vermilya-Brown, that complete jurisdiction and control over Guan-
tanamo Bay was not the functional equivalent to sovereignty.' 91 However, un-
like the Court's conclusion in Vermilya-Brown, the Eleventh Circuit refused to
recognize the naval base at Guantanamo Bay as a possession of the United States
or any like territory to which the Bill of Rights extended. Thus, the court con-
cluded that if the Cuban and Haitian migrants had any rights while being held in
Guantanamo Bay, it would depend on the extraterritorial application of statutory
or constitutional provisions.' 92 Finding no provisions with such application, the
court held that the migrants could not claim constitutional or other statutory pro-
tections to challenge their detention.193
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Christopher when it decided Bird
v. United States.194 In Bird, the plaintiff sued a military doctor at Guantanamo
Bay for medical malpractice for failing to properly and timely diagnose her medi-
cal condition, a brain tumor. 195 The plaintiff based her suit on the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA").19 6 The court first noted that, while the FICA granted a
limited waiver to the government's sovereign immunity for complaints involving
negligence by government employees, it expressly exempted claims arising in
foreign countries from taking advantage of this limited waiver. 197 The court then
187 id. at 390.
188 Id.
189 Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11 th Cir. 1995).
190 Id. at 1424-25; see also Hawkins, supra note 180, at 1257.
191 Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1425 (referring to the extent of control the United States had over Guanta-
namo Bay as agreed in the lease agreements with Cuba); see also MURPHY, supra note 168 (discussing
the lease agreements and treaty between the United States and Cuba giving the United States the right to
establish the naval base at Guantanamo).
192 Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1425; see also Hawkins, supra note 180, at 1257.
193 Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1428-29 (noting that "unadmitted and excludable aliens 'cannot claim
equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment, even with regard to challenging the Executive's
exercise of its parole discretion'" (internal citations omitted)).
194 Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996).
195 Id. at 339; see also Hawkins, supra note 180, at 1258.
196 Bird, 923 F. Supp. at 339-40; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000):
[Tihe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages ... or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment.
197 Federal Tort Claims Act, Exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000) ("The provisions of this chapter
and section ... shall not apply to ... (k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.").
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found that because the lease agreements giving the United States jurisdiction and
control over Guantanamo Bay unequivocally left sovereignty of the land to Cuba,
Guantanamo Bay must be considered a foreign country for the purposes of apply-
ing FTCA. 198 Thus, the court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiffs claim. 199
IH. Discussion
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the Petitioners were entitled to
access U.S. courts to challenge their detention at the naval base at Guantanamo
Bay. 2°° The District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, relying on Eisentrager, found that the Petitioners were barred
from accessing U.S. courts. 20 1 However, after the Petitioners successfully peti-
tioned for certiorari, the Court reversed in a 6-3 decision. 20 2 Justice Kennedy
filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Thomas, dissented.20 3
A. Facts
Rasul consolidated Rasul v. Bush2 °4 ("Rasul ") and Odah v. United States.20 5
In Rasul I, petitioners in the case included Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, citizens
of the United Kingdom, and David Hicks, a citizen of Australia (together the
"Rasul Petitioners"). 20 6 Petitioner Rasul alleged that he took a hiatus from his
studies in the United Kingdom to visit his home country of Pakistan to see rela-
tives and explore its culture. 20 7 He then decided to stay in Pakistan after Septem-
ber 11, 2001 to continue his education for less than it would have cost him to
take similar courses in the United Kingdom.20 8 He further alleged that while
traveling in the country, forces fighting against the United States kidnapped
him.20 9 Similarly, petitioner Iqbal alleged that he traveled to Pakistan after Sep-
tember 11, 2001 to get married. 210 Shortly before his wedding, forces fighting
198 Bird, 923 F. Supp. at 342-43 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court defined the term "foreign coun-
try" in United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 218 (1949) as a "territory subject to the sovereignty of
another nation").
199 Id. at 343.
200 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
201 See infra Part III.B (discussing the lower courts' opinions).
202 See infra Part IlI.C.1 (discussing the Supreme Court's majority opinion).
203 See infra Part I1l.C.2 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion); see also Part 11l.C.3
(discussing Justice Scalia's dissent).
204 Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299, mem. (D.D.C. July, 2002), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02-299.pdf.
205 Odah v. United States, No. 02-828, mem. (D.D.C., Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/
02-828.pdf.
206 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002).
207 Id. at 59.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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against the United States kidnapped him while he was traveling outside his home
village. 2 1 With respect to petitioner Hicks, there was little known about the
reasons for his presence in Afghanistan except that he was living in the country at
the time of his capture.212
The Rasul Petitioners were all captured in Afghanistan after the United States
commenced military operations against the Taliban in that country. 213 The cir-
cumstances of Rasul and Iqbal's capture were unknown, except that they were
captured by an undetermined third party and transferred into U.S. custody in
early December, 2001 .214 Hicks was captured in Afghanistan by the Northern
Alliance, a group funded and supported by the United States in the fight against
the Taliban, and was transferred to U.S. custody in mid-December, 2001 .2 15
The Rasul'Petitioners filed an action in the District of Columbia District Court
to challenge their detention, to allow them unmonitored access to counsel, and to
enjoin the United States from interrogating them any further. 216 They claimed
that they did not voluntarily join a terrorist force nor do anything that would be
considered outside of their protected religious and personal rights.217 They fur-
ther claimed that if they took up arms against the United States, they did so only
as a spontaneous reaction to resist an approaching invading force and without
sufficient time to organize themselves into regular armed units subject to the
internationally recognized rules of war.21 8
In Odah, the petitioners included twelve Kuwaiti citizens captured in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, and transferred to U.S. custody (hereinafter referred to as the
"Odah Petitioners" and, together with the Rasul Petitioners, hereinafter referred
to as the "Petitioners"). 219 They alleged that they were in those countries on
volunteer charitable missions supported by the Kuwaiti government. 220 They
further alleged that the Kuwaiti government encouraged such charitable work by
continuing to pay its employees while engaged in this type of volunteer service
abroad. 221 They filed an action in the District of Columbia District Court seeking
an injunction prohibiting the United States from denying them access to their
families, and to force the United States to inform them of the charges against
them and grant them access to U.S. courts or some other independent tribunal to
hear their grievances. 222 They alleged that they had never been combatants or
belligerent against the United States, nor were they ever supporters of the Taliban
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 60.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 57.
217 Id. at 60.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 61.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 58.
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or any terrorist organization. 223 They further claimed that they were captured in
Afghanistan or Pakistan by villagers seeking bounty or other financial
rewards. 22
4
In the consolidated complaint, the Petitioners raised three theories to support
their challenges. 225 First, they contended that their continued detention violated
their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.2 26 Second, they claimed
that the actions of the United States violated the Alien Tort Claims Act.227 Third,
they alleged that the actions of the United States were arbitrary, unlawful, and
unconstitutional behavior in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.228 In
response, the United States filed a motion to dismiss the entire complaint on the
basis that the District of Columbia District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.229
B. Lower Courts' Decisions
1. District Court
Initially, the District of Columbia District Court noted that in considering the
Government's motion to dismiss, the court must accept the Petitioners' allega-
tions in their pleadings as true, but that the Petitioners carried the burden to prove
that the court had jurisdiction.230 The court also noted that the Petitioners
claimed that the court had jurisdiction under, among other laws, the Habeas
Statute.2
31
In addition, the court noted that the writ of habeas corpus had long been held
as the only means an individual could use to challenge his or her custody as a
violation of the Constitution or U.S. law. 232 Consequently, because the Petition-
ers sought relief from their detention, the court found that the claims under the
Alien Tort Claims Act and the Administrative Procedure Act were actually
habeas appeals.233 Furthermore, the court found that, although the Odah Peti-
tioners did not directly join the Rasul Petitioners in seeking relief from their
detention, the Odah Petitioners were indirectly challenging their detention. 234 To
support this finding, the court noted that the Odah Petitioners expressly stated
that their purpose for seeking a hearing in an independent forum was to challenge
223 Id. at 61.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 58.
226 Id.
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005); see also Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
228 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 702, and 706 (2005); see also Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
229 Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 62.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 62-63.
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their detention.235 Thus, the court concluded that the Petitioners' entire consoli-
dated complaint must be viewed as a habeas petition.2 36
With this conclusion, the court reasoned that Eisentrager was directly applica-
ble to the Petitioners. 237 The court noted that Eisentrager distinguished between
citizens and aliens when determining the extent of protections allowed under the
Constitution. 238 The court also noted that Eisentrager further distinguished be-
tween aliens inside and outside U.S. territorial sovereignty.2 39 The court found
that aliens within U.S. territorial sovereignty were afforded qualified rights under
the Constitution. 240 On the other hand, aliens outside U.S. territorial sovereignty
were afforded a limited review only in cases where they applied for and were
denied U.S. citizenship. 24' Moreover, the court declined to accept the Petition-
ers' reasoning that Eisentrager turned on the determination that the prisoners in
that case were enemy aliens.2 42 Instead, the court reasoned that Eisentrager
turned on the presence of the prisoners outside U.S. territorial sovereignty, find-
ing such prisoners without any rights under the Constitution. 243 The court found
that the designation of "enemy" versus "friendly alien" was immaterial under
such circumstances. 244 As such, the court concluded that the status of the naval
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was the controlling issue in determining whether
the court had jurisdiction to hear the Petitioners' complaint. 245
In determining the status of the naval base, the court noted three facts. First,
the court found that the Petitioners did not deny that the base was outside U.S.
sovereign territory, though the court also noted that this alone was not determina-
tive of the base's status.246 Second, the court reasoned that only de jure sover-
eignty over a territory was a sufficient basis to extend constitutional protections
to Guantanamo Bay.24 7 Thus, even if the court accepted the Petitioners' argu-
ment that the extensive control the United States exercised over Guantanamo Bay
was equivalent to de facto sovereignty, it was not enough.248 The court noted
that the Christopher and Bird courts had already determined as much. 249 Third,
the court found that the lease agreement between the United States and Cuba for
235 Id. at 63.
236 Id. at 62.
237 Id. at 65.
238 Id. at 65-66 (discussing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1956)).
239 Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770).
240 Id. at 66 (citing Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908)).
241 Id. at 67 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 553 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)).
242 Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78).
243 Id. (citing Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 693).
244 Id. at 67.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 69.
247 Id. at 71.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 71-72 (citing Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 343 (1996) and Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n
v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995)).
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Guantanamo Bay expressly reserved de jure sovereignty over the territory to
Cuba.250 Thus, the court concluded that the United States did not exercise suffi-
cient sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay to put the Petitioners outside the ambit
of Eisentrager.25 l Therefore, the court held that the Petitioners were barred by
Eisentrager from accessing U.S. courts and could not rely on the provisions of
the Habeas Statute to challenge their detention.252
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the District Court's conclusion.253 The court
also agreed that Eisentrager applied to bar the Petitioners' habeas appeal on ju-
risdictional grounds. 254 Like the District Court, the court reasoned that the en-
emy alien designation of the Eisentrager petitioners was immaterial to the
Eisentrager holding. 255 The court also reasoned that Eisentrager deprived the
Petitioners of any rights under the Constitution upon which to base their habeas
appeal. 256 The court found that such a conclusion was supported by the Supreme
Court's express rejection in Eisentrager of the extraterritorial application of the
Fifth Amendment to aliens irrespective of their location outside of U.S. territorial
sovereignty as well as the affirmation of that rejection in Verdugo-Urquidez.257
The D.C. Circuit also rejected the Petitioners' contention that Eisentrager re-
quired either sovereignty or territorial jurisdiction to trigger Fifth Amendment
protections.258 The court noted that Eisentrager's use of "territorial jurisdiction"
did not imply that something less than sovereignty was required to extend Fifth
Amendment protections. 259 Instead, the court reasoned that Eisentrager's refer-
ence to territorial jurisdiction was intended to describe the extent of federal court
jurisdiction and not as a trigger of constitutional protections. 260 The court con-
cluded that nothing short of U.S. sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay was suffi-
cient to trigger Fifth Amendment protections. 261 Because the lease agreement
made clear that Cuba retained sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, the court found
that the Petitioners did not have any defendable constitutional rights upon which
to base their habeas appeal. 262
250 Id. at 71 (citing Bird, 923 F. Supp. at 343).
251 Id. at 72-73.
252 Id.
253 A] Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. 2003).
254 Id. at 1140.
255 Id. at 1141 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950)).
256 Id.
257 Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)).
258 Id. at 1142.
259 Id. at 1143.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1144.
262 Id. at 1145.
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C. U.S. Supreme Court Decision
In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit.263 The majority implicitly held that
territorial jurisdiction over the place of custody was sufficient to trigger Fifth
Amendment protections and as such the Petitioners could challenge their deten-
tion through a writ of habeas corpus. 2 6 4 Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred
with the majority's conclusion, but argued that the background and circum-
stances of detention should control whether Fifth Amendment protections should
be extended. 265 In a scathing dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that nothing less
than sovereignty over the place of custody was required for application of the
Fifth Amendment. 266 Because it was indisputable that the United States did not
have sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, Justice Scalia argued that the Petitioners
were without any rights under the Constitution or U.S. law, and therefore could
not invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 2 6 7
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority held that the Petitioners had the right to a habeas appeal to chal-
lenge their detention by the United States in Guantanamo Bay.268 To reach this
conclusion, the Court first reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was intended
to be a last resort for a prisoner to challenge his detention by the Executive.269
The Court also acknowledged that, in the case of aliens detained outside U.S.
territorial sovereignty, its decision in Eisentrager was implicated. 270 However,
the Court distinguished Eisentrager, noting that its holding relied on constitu-
tional rather than statutory grounds. 271 The Court found that the appellate court's
opinion in Eisentrager granted the Eisentrager prisoners access to federal court
because they had a constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment.272 This, the Court reasoned, was what Eisentrager reversed.2 73 As such,
the Eisentrager decision did not determine, for example, whether the Eisentrager
263 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
264 Id. at 476.
265 See generally id. at 488.
266 Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 483.
269 Id. at 474-75. The Court framed the issue in the case as "whether the habeas statute confers a right
to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United
States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ultimate sovereignty." Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 474-79 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)) (noting that the Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisentrager, which was based on constitutional grounds).
272 Id. at 474; see also supra Part l.B.2 (discussing the D.C. Circuit's decision in Eisentrager).
273 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474.
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prisoners were barred by the Habeas Statute from filing a habeas appeal.274
Thus, because the only issue raised in Rasul was statutory in nature, Eisentrager
had no application to bar the Petitioners' habeas appeal. 275
Furthermore, the Court explained that six keys facts in Eisentrager were es-
sential to its holding.276 Specifically, the Eisentrager prisoners were (1) enemy
aliens, (2) not residing in nor been to the United States, (3) captured and held by
military authorities outside the United States, (4) tried and convicted by a mili-
tary commission sitting outside the United States, (5) for war crimes committed
outside the United States, and (6) at all times imprisoned outside the United
States.277 The Court reasoned that the Petitioners were distinguishable from the
Eisentrager prisoners in that the Petitioners were not nationals of a country with
which the United States was at war and denied that they engaged in any acts of
aggression against the United States.278 In addition, unlike the Eisentrager pris-
oners, the Petitioners were denied access to any tribunal and were not even
charged with any wrongdoing for more than two years at a detention center over
which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control. 279 Thus, the
Court concluded that the Petitioners' circumstances were sufficiently distinguish-
able to make Eisentrager inapplicable as a bar to the Petitioners' habeas
appeal. 280
Of particular significance, the Court reasoned that Eisentrager could not apply
when the detention at issue took place at a location within U.S. territorial juris-
diction.281  The Court reasoned that, while there was no dispute that the naval
base at Guantanamo Bay was outside U.S. sovereign territory, sovereignty was
not key to the operation of the Habeas Statute. 282 Rather, the extent and nature of
control exercised over a territory could also be sufficient to extend the reach of
the Statute.283 Because the United States exercised complete jurisdiction and
control over Guantanamo Bay, the Court concluded that such control was suffi-
cient to justify the Statute's application to prisoners held at the naval base. 284 To
strengthen this conclusion, the Court noted that there was no dispute that federal
courts had jurisdiction over claims by American citizens held at the base.285 As
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 See id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the majority
opinion in Eisentrager).
278 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474.
279 Id.
280 See generally id. at 474-75.
281 See generally id.
282 Id. at 480.
283 Id. (noting that historically, early English cases "confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not
on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of the exact extent and
nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the Crown") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
284 Id.
285 Id.
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such, since the Habeas Statute did not make any distinction based on alienage in
its application, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to create a limita-
tion on the extent of the Statute's reach based on a prisoner's citizenship. 286
Having addressed the application of Eisentrager, the Court next determined
that the language of the Habeas Statute itself did not bar the Petitioners' ap-
peal. 287 While the Statute conferred authority to issue the writ to federal courts
only within their respective territorial jurisdiction, it did not bar courts from issu-
ing the writ so long as the custodian was within the issuing court's territorial
reach, even if the prisoner was not.288 The Court reasoned that Ahrens, which
required that the prisoner be present within the territorial jurisdiction of the issu-
ing court, was effectively overruled by Braden, where the Court held that such a
requirement was not a prerequisite to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.289 Con-
sequently, the Court concluded that the fact that the Petitioners were detained in a
location over which no federal court had jurisdiction was of no importance if a
federal court had jurisdiction over their custodian, namely the U.S. military.290
In other words, the Habeas Statute's jurisdictional requirement would be satisfied
if the Petitioners filed their habeas appeal in a federal court that could reach the
U.S. military with process. 291
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's conclusion but differed on the rea-
soning behind it.292 He reasoned that Eisentrager's holding should be viewed as
denying judicial interference in matters reserved by the Constitution to the Exec-
utive and the Legislative branches. 293 In other words, the Separation of Powers
Clause prevented courts from considering the Eisentrager prisoners' habeas peti-
tion because, absent some connection to the United States, there was no nexus to
invoke such authority. 294 Justice Kennedy interpreted this approach as recogniz-
ing a realm of political authority over military affairs where judicial authority
should not interfere. 295 He further reasoned that such an approach required an
inquiry into the circumstances of the detention to determine whether courts could
entertain a habeas petition and thus grant relief.296 Because the Eisentrager pris-
oners were proven enemy aliens and were detained outside the United States, and
286 Id.
287 Id. at 483.
288 Id. (citing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)).
289 Id.; see also supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the Ahrens decision); Part II.B.3 (discussing the Braden
decision). In a bizarre twist, the Court reasoned without further explanation that Braden also overruled
"the statutory predicate to Eisentrager." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
290 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.
291 See generally id.
292 Id. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293 Id.
294 See generally id.
295 Id. at 486.
296 Id.
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because the existence of jurisdiction would have undermined the authority of the
military commanders on the field of battle in a time of war, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the matter in Eisentrager was appropriately left to the Executive,
and thus no jurisdiction to hear the prisoners' claims was found.297 However, as
a corollary to this approach, he also reasoned that where the facts and circum-
stances of detention were different, a different conclusion could be reached. 298
Applying this approach to the Petitioners, Justice Kennedy determined that the
facts of Rasul were sufficiently distinguishable from Eisentrager, rendering
Eisentrager inapplicable as a bar to the Petitioners' habeas appeal for two rea-
sons.299 First, he agreed with the majority's reasoning that the extent of the
United States' jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo Bay justified the reach
of the Habeas Statute over it.300 Second, he found that the indefinite nature of
the Petitioners' detention coupled with the total denial of access to any tribunal in
which to challenge such detention called for judicial review. 301 He reasoned that
such confinement could result in detaining both friends and foe alike without any
recourse, and could not be justified by any military exigency, particularly when
custody was outside any zones of active combat. 302
Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that because of the particular facts of Rasul,
jurisdiction over the Petitioners' habeas petition should be found. 30 3 He reasoned
that this approach was preferable to the majority's approach which, by basing
such authority on jurisdiction over the custodian, would have granted automatic
statutory jurisdiction over claims of persons held outside the United States.304
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dis-
sented. 30 5 In a scornful opinion, he disagreed with the Court's reasoning and
found that the Habeas Statute should not be extended to aliens held by the mili-
tary outside U.S. sovereign territory and outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
court.
3 0 6
Justice Scalia first noted that, while the Eisentrager opinion was largely de-
voted to the determination that the Eisentrager prisoners did not have a constitu-
tional right to a habeas appeal, it implied that there was also no statutory source
297 See generally id.
298 Id. at 486.
299 Id.
300 Id. Justice Kennedy found the unchallenged and indefinite nature of United States' control over
Guantanamo to be key to this conclusion. Id. He reasoned that such control "produced a place that
belongs to the United States, extending the "implied protection" of the United States to it." Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 488.
304 Id. at 486-87.
305 Id. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306 Id.
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for such a right.30 7 He also noted that the appellate court in Eisentrager found
jurisdiction to hear the prisoners' habeas appeals because it had, for one, deter-
mined that the prisoners had a constitutional right to such an appeal, and sec-
ondly, because it was trying to avoid declaring the Habeas Statute
unconstitutional for denying such a right.308 In other words, the prisoners' con-
stitutional right was the source of the appellate court's finding of jurisdiction.309
Justice Scalia reasoned that once the Eisentrager Court rejected this source, it
was reasonable to presume that the Eisentrager Court did not find any other
source for jurisdiction.310 Otherwise, the Court would have agreed with the ap-
pellate court's conclusion, but disagreed with the reasoning behind it.311 Thus,
Justice Scalia concluded that Eisentrager's rule was that the Habeas Statute did
not confer court jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals by aliens held outside U.S.
sovereign territory.
3 12
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that Braden did not overrule Ahrens, but,
instead, it merely distinguished it.313 He found that Braden stood for the proposi-
tion that, where a prisoner was held in multiple jurisdictions within the United
States, he or she may seek a writ of habeas corpus in the jurisdiction of his legal
confinement. 314 This was the case even if such location was not the location of
his physical confinement. 31 5 However, outside of this limited circumstance,
Ahrens's jurisdictional rule limited a federal court's authority to hear habeas ap-
peals from prisoners detained within the court's territorial reach.316 As such,
since the Petitioners were not held in multiple jurisdictions in the United States,
their petition did not justify application of Braden's limited exception to the
Ahrens rule.31 7 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that Ahrens required the Petition-
ers' presence within the territorial reach of a federal court before that court could
have jurisdiction to hear their habeas appeal. 3 18
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the Court's finding that complete jurisdic-
tion and control over Guantanamo Bay was sufficient to extend the reach of the
307 Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See generally id.
312 Id. at 493-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313 ld.
314 Id.
315 Id. Justice Scalia further distinguished Braden on the basis that it focused solely on the choice of
forum in which the Braden prisoner could file his habeas appeal. Id. at 495-96. He reasoned that Braden
was concerned with the expense and inconvenience of transporting prisoners, witnesses, or records long
distances to the issuing court. Id. This, he reasoned, was at odds with the Rasul decision since this
decision required domestic hearings for prisoners held abroad and dealing with events that transpired
abroad. Id. Justice Scalia further reasoned that the Rasul holding, in essence, allowed the Petitioners to
forum-shop, which the Habeas Statute was expressly promulgated to prevent. Id. at 497-99.
316 Id. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317 Id. at 494-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318 Id.
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Habeas Statute to the naval base there.319 He reasoned that such jurisdiction and
control could also be achieved by lawful force of arms, which would imply that
the Habeas Statute could logically extend to parts of Iraq and Afghanistan under
U.S. control.320 In fact, the statute could also extend to the prison in Landsberg,
Germany, where the Eisentrager prisoners were held. 321 Therefore, Justice
Scalia found that such logic was untenable and could result in an unreasonable
expansion of the scope of the Habeas Statute. 322
In summary, Justice Scalia concluded that the extension of the Habeas Statute
was unjustified by logic or case law. 323 Particularly, he found such an extension
during wartime to be judicial adventurism of the worst kind.324 He reasoned that
the Executive was justified in relying on the Court's prior precedent to expect
that detaining the Petitioners in Guantanamo Bay would shield military affairs
from the cumbersome machinery of domestic courts.325 Instead, the Court's de-
cision would effectively allow the Petitioners to choose any one of ninety-four
federal courts to file their habeas petition.326
IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Petitioners had the right to the
writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention. 327 However, in reaching this
conclusion, the Court misconstrued its own precedent in Eisentrager and the ex-
tent to which Braden applied to the Petitioner's appeal.328 The key to the Court's
holding in Rasul was its implicit finding that the Habeas Statute did not require
U.S. sovereignty over the place of detention in order to grant a prisoner the right
of a writ to challenge such detention.329
Furthermore, the Rasul holding leaves untouched the question of the Petition-
ers' rights under the Constitution.330 The Court avoided the issue by refusing to
recognize that its Eisentrager holding was largely based on its finding that a
connection with the United States is a sine qua non for the extraterritorial appli-
319 Id. at 500-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. Justice Scalia also found no support for extending the reach of the Habeas Statute in case law.
Id. at 502-504. He found that the cases noted by the Court in support of its holding were clearly distin-
guishable on the basis that the prisoner was held in a territory over which the United States had clear
authority by treaty or was himself an American citizen. Id.
323 Id. at 493-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324 Id.
325 Id. at 504-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326 Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the Rasul holding within the context of the dissenting opinion's
rationale).
328 The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. Rav. 396, 396 (2004) ("The major-
ity misread its precedents in concluding that the habeas statute conferred jurisdiction independent of what
the Constitution requires."); see infra Part IV.A.
329 See infra Part IV.A.
330 See infra Part IV.B.
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cation of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.331 By so refusing, the Court
only delayed addressing the issue and guaranteed that the Petitioners would re-
main incarcerated for years to come or until the President, at his own discretion,
decides to free them. 332
A. The Jurisdictional Approach Adopted by the Rasul Court
1. Analysis of Historical Precedent
The first step in understanding the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul is to
analyze the full implications of the Supreme Court's decisions in Ahrens, Bra-
den, and Eisentrager.333 In Ahrens, the Court was asked to interpret the extent of
federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals by aliens.3 34  The issue in
Ahrens involved a procedural question as to the proper forum for the detained
aliens to file their habeas appeal.335 At no point did the Ahrens Court question
the aliens' right to file such an appeal.336 Moreover, at no point did the Ahrens
Court conclude, for example, that the Ahrens prisoners could not file their peti-
tion in the district court sitting in New York.337 Although Justice Rutledge's
dissent in the case focused on the fact that the Court's decision created a jurisdic-
tional threshold that could defeat a habeas petition on purely procedural grounds,
there was nothing in the Court's opinion to indicate that such procedural grounds
are sufficient to completely deny a petitioner's right to the writ.338 In other
words, because the petitioners could have filed their petition in the district court
sitting in New York, there were no substantive constitutional implications to
override the procedural defect that the Court found. 339
Next, the Supreme Court considered Eisentrager and the application of the
Habeas Statute to alien prisoners that were at no time within U.S. territorial juris-
331 The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, supra note 328, at 396 ("[tlhe Supreme Court
recognized the perils of allowing courts to hamper wartime security, and set forth specific limits on the
jurisdiction of federal courts over claims brought by nonresident or resident aliens. These limits followed
the common law tradition of excluding alien combatants and prisoners of war from access to the writ of
habeas corpus."); see also infra Part IV.B.
332 See infra Part IV.B.
333 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476-79 (2004); see also supra Part III.C.l (discussing
the Rasul majority opinion).
334 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Ahrens decision).
335 See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Is The Attorney General the Custodian of an INS Detainee? Personal
Jurisdiction and the "Immediate Custodian" Rule in Immigration-Related Habeas Actions, 27 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 543, 552 (2001).
336 See generally Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
337 See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 500 (1973) ("On the facts of Ahrens itself
... petitioners could have challenged their detention by bringing an action in the Eastern District of New
York against the federal officials who confined them in that district."); see also supra Part II.B.1 (dis-
cussing the Ahrens decision); see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Braden decision).
338 Braden, 410 U.S. at 499-500 (noting that in view of the developments since Ahrens, Ahrens could
not be viewed as imposing an inflexible jurisdictional rule, forcing the choice of an inconvenient forum
even in a case that could not have been foreseen when Ahrens was decided).
339 Id. at 500.
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diction. 340 The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's opinion that found jurisdiction
based on constitutional grounds. 34 1 In so doing, the Court reasoned that the right
to due process was conditioned on the alien's presence within a U.S. territorial
jurisdiction. 342  The underlying rationale behind this decision was two-fold.
First, the Court impliedly concluded that the petitioners lacked Fifth Amendment
rights, or any other constitutional rights, upon which a habeas appeal could be
based because they had no connection with the United States, outside the facts of
their incarceration. 343 Second, because the petitioners lacked a sufficient consti-
tutional basis to invoke the power of the judiciary in any district, there was no
need to consider the operation of the jurisdictional limitations of the Habeas Stat-
ute to determine the appropriate forum in which the petitioners could file their
habeas appeal. 344
The Supreme Court reached the clash between the procedural and substantive
requirements of the writ of habeas corpus in Braden.345 In Braden, the jurisdic-
tional limitation on habeas appeals enunciated by the Court in Ahrens would have
effectively barred the petitioner from exercising his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. 346 In other words, the Court faced the same choices that the D.C.
Circuit in Eisentrager faced: declare the Habeas Statute unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the Braden petitioners or construe the statute as vesting jurisdiction in
the district court in Kentucky. 347 The Court chose the second approach and
found that the language of the Habeas Statute required nothing more than the
issuing court having jurisdiction over the custodian responsible for the chal-
lenged detention. 348 In essence, the Court impliedly indicated that it would by-
pass the procedural rule from Ahrens only if it was an impediment to a
petitioner's exercise of his or her constitutionally-guaranteed substantive right.349
340 Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule by Law: The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L.
225, 254 (2003) (discussing the importance of the location of the German enemy aliens).
341 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisentrager).
342 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("The alien, to whom the United States has been
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe
conduct and gives him certain rights..."); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the majority opinion in
Eisentrager).
343 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776.
344 Id. at 790-91 ("Since in the present application we find no basis for invoking federal judicial
power in any district, we need not debate as to where, if the case were otherwise, the petition should be
filed.").
345 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Braden decision).
346 Id.
347 See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
348 See id. at 494-95; see also Christopher M. Schumann, Bring It On: The Supreme Court Opens the
Floodgates with Rasul v. Bush, 55 A.F. L. REV. 349, 358 (2004) ("[t]he Rasul Court found that the
Braden decision held that application of the writ does not necessarily depend upon the location of the
party invoking it, but rather upon the location of the government actor who has orchestrated the
detention.").
349 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493-95 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra Part fII.C.3
(discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Rasul).
72 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 3, Issue 1
Rasul v. Bush
2. Application of Historical Precedent
The Rasul Court's interpretation of Braden as overruling Ahrens's jurisdic-
tional rule may be an overstatement of Braden's impact. 350 As Justice Scalia
argued in his dissent, Braden distinguished Ahrens by conferring authority on
federal courts to hear a habeas appeal based on jurisdiction over the custodian
when reliance on territorial jurisdiction alone would have deprived the Braden
petitioner of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to a speedy trial. 35' In other
words, the determination that the petitioner in Braden had a constitutionally-
guaranteed right to enforce in federal court was the predicate to the Court's deter-
mination that the Habeas Statute could not deprive him of that right on procedu-
ral grounds.352 To interpret Braden in any other way would be tantamount to
giving federal courts worldwide jurisdiction over any claims by federal prisoners
or detainees. 353 There was nothing in Braden to indicate that the Court intended
such expansive result.354
In addition, as Justice Scalia argued, the Court's conclusion that Braden over-
ruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager may be inaccurate. 355 The Eisen-
trager Court never reached the statutory question addressed by Braden and did
not determine the impact of the jurisdictional limitations in § 2241(a) to the peti-
tioners in the case. 356 The Eisentrager Court concluded that because the petition-
ers did not have cognizable constitutional or statutory rights, the question of the
choice of forum in which to enforce these rights was irrelevant. 357 In other
words, the Court impliedly concluded that the petitioners could not file a habeas
appeal under § 2241(c)(3) because their detention was not in violation of the
350 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (majority opinion) (arguing that Braden impliedly overruled
Ahrens's jurisdictional rule in all circumstances).
351 See id. at 492-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Braden Court was careful to distinguish
the exception it was creating in Braden from the general rule of Ahrens); see also Schumann, supra note
348, at 363 (noting that the key of Braden was the fact that the Court recognized that it would serve no
useful purpose to apply the Ahrens general rule to the Braden petitioner who was being incarcerated in
Alabama when it was Kentucky directing his detention, which was the basis of his habeas appeal).
352 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 496 (noting that Braden's analysis was based on forum inconvenience,
something that did not play a part in the Eisentrager decision); see also supra Part 1II.C.3 (discussing
Justice Scalia's dissent in Rasul); see also Rosenbloom, supra note 335, at 553-54 (noting that while state
and federal convictions were no longer governed by Ahrens as a result of the Braden decision, other
types of cases, including cases of military confinement, extradition, immigration, interstate detainers, and
challenges to the legality of prison term, were subject to Ahrens's territorial limitation).
353 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499-500; see also supra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Rasul).
354 See generally Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
355 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 492-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that even if Braden overruled parts of
Ahrens, the fact that Braden did not touch any of the statutory issues considered by Eisentrager makes it
hard to accept the proposition that Braden overruled any part of Eisentrager).
356 See Braden, 410 U.S. at 488 (stating that the Braden petitioner was entitled to raise his constitu-
tional challenge for a speedy trial and that the issue before the Court was the choice of forum in which to
review such challenge).
357 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (1950) ("Since in the present application we find no
basis for invoking federal judicial power in any district, we need not debate as to where, if the case were
otherwise, the petition should be filed.").
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Constitution or any laws of the United States.358 Thus, it is difficult to see how
Braden's conclusion, based upon the interpretation of the procedural limitations
in § 2241(a), could have had any impact on Eisentrager's holding-which was
based on the substantive limitations in § 2241(c)(3). 359
However, contrary to Justice Scalia's conclusion, the Court's holding in Rasul
did not overturn Eisentrager.360 Eisentrager was premised on two key facts.361
First, the prisoners in the case were found guilty of war crimes against the United
States by a military tribunal. 362 However, even enemy aliens had a limited right
of review of their enemy designation so long as they had sufficient connection
with U.S. territorial jurisdiction. 363 Second, and more importantly, although the
Court reached this conclusion based solely on factual allegations in the pleadings
and not on any factual findings by the trial court, the Court found that the prison-
ers did not have any connection with the United States. 364 This fact alone was
the basis for the Court's conclusion that the prisoners did not merit even the
limited review afforded to enemy aliens who possess sufficient connections to
the United States. 365 Without any cognizable rights under the Constitution or
358 Id. at 790.
359 Id. The Court noted that both the district and appellate courts in Eisentrager decided the case
based on case law where the petitioner's right to habeas appeal was unquestioned and the only issue left
to resolve was where to make such appeal. Id. However, the Eisentrager Court found that petitioners in
that case did not have a constitutional claim to support their right to a habeas appeal and, therefore, the
issue of which forum to make this appeal was irrelevant. Id. at 790-91.
360 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 492-495 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), (discussing Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Rasul). Justice Scalia argued that because Braden did not deal with the
issues involved in Eisentrager, Braden did not overturn Eisentrager. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493-95. Thus,
by finding jurisdiction to hear the Rasul Petitioners' habeas appeal, the Court must logically reverse
Eisentrager whose holding would be directly contrary to the holding of Rasul. Id.
361 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777. While the Eisentrager Court listed six key facts that it found rele-
vant to its analysis, these facts can be summarized to the petitioners' status as friendly or enemy alien and
the level of connection they had with the United States. Id.
To support [the assumption that the petitioners are entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, to
sue in federal court] we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally
entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all
times imprisoned outside the United States.
Id.
362 Id. at 776.
363 Id. at 775.
The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deporta-
tion whenever a "declared war" exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive
custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so
subject to the Alien Enemy Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts
will not inquire into any other issue as to his internment.
Id.; see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the majority opinion in Eisentrager).
364 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778 ("[A]t no relevant time were [the Eisentrager petitioners] within any
territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their
trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.").
365 Id.
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U.S. law, the Eisentrager prisoners did not have sufficient grounds to invoke the
protections of the Habeas Statute under § 2241(c)(3). 366
As such, the Court's finding in Rasul that Guantanamo Bay was effectively
within U.S. territorial jurisdiction, and, by implication that the Rasul prisoners
had sufficient connections to the United States, put them outside the ambit of
Eisentrager.367 The Rasul Court determined that the United States exercised
complete jurisdiction and control over the land and could retain such jurisdiction
and control for as long as it desired.368 In addition, the Court expressly refused
to consider applying the Habeas Statute to prisoners in Guantanamo Bay as an
extraterritorial application of the statute, considering such application to be
within U.S. territorial jurisdiction.369
It is wholly unclear what criteria the Court found to be controlling in its desig-
nation of Guantanamo Bay as within U.S. territorial jurisdiction.370  It is also
unclear how the Court's decision in Rasul comports with its decision in Ver-
milya-Brown where the Court concluded that complete jurisdiction and control
were not sufficient to find that the United States exercised sovereignty over a
territory. 371 What is clear is that the Court decided that territorial jurisdiction,
not sovereignty, is sufficient to trigger the Habeas Statute. 372
This approach has merit in light of the nature of control the United States
exercises over Guantanamo Bay.373 The lease between the United States and
Cuba gave the United States extensive control over Guantanamo Bay, although it
reserved ultimate sovereignty for Cuba.374 Unlike the Bermuda lease the Court
considered in Vermilya-Brown, the Guantanamo Bay lease does not impose a
durational requirement upon its validity.375 In fact, it vests complete discretion
366 Id. at 790-91; see also supra Part HI.B.2 (discussing the majority opinion in Eisentrager).
367 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004). Although the Court noted that the Petitioners' claims
"unquestionably describe" acts in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, the
Court did not really explain how the Petitioners could have any rights to enforce them unless the location
of the Petitioners' detention was such that the protections of both the Constitution and the laws of the
United States extended there. Id. at 483-84.
368 Id. at 480-81; see also supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority's opinion in Rasul).
369 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81.
370 See id.; see also The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, supra note 328, at 402 (noting
that both the majority and concurring opinions in Rasul downplayed the canon that some physical con-
nection between the prisoner and the United States was required to trigger the prisoner's constitutional
right to access U.S. courts).
371 See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the legal status of Guantanamo Bay).
372 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81; see also supra Part HI.C.l (discussing the majority's opinion in Rasul).
While the Court did not expressly state that the level of control the United States exercises over Guanta-
namo Bay was sufficient to extend operations of the Habeas Statute to the territory, it clearly establishes
that the doctrine of extraterritoriality "has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with
respect to persons detained within 'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United States." Rasul, 542 U.S. at
480. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that Cuba retained sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.
Id. at 469-73. Read together, one can reasonably conclude that territorial jurisdiction was a concept less
than full sovereignty and sufficient by itself for the operation of the Habeas Statute.
373 See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81.
374 See id. at 469-72; see also supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the history of Guantanamo Bay).
375 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81; see also supra Part ll.D.2 (discussing the legal status of Guantanamo
Bay).
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in the United States to determine if and when control of the land should revert
back to Cuba.376 Furthermore, unlike the base in Bermuda, the base at Guanta-
namo Bay effectively operates outside the constraints of Cuban law. 377 The base
is separated by 50,000 mines planted in Cuban territory around the base to pre-
vent anyone from entering the base without the express authorization of the
United States.378 In fact, the United States, not Cuba, controls all entry and exit
points to the base.379 Moreover, unlike any other U.S. overseas military base,
there is no Status-of-Forces Agreement defining the allocation of civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over military and other personnel at Guantanamo Bay.380 Indeed,
in recent years, the United States exercised criminal jurisdiction over both citi-
zens and aliens on the land to the exclusion of Cuban law. 381 Criminal defend-
ants were brought to the United States for trial and were given the full panoply of
constitutional protections. 382 In sum, while Cuba retained ultimate jurisdiction
over the land on paper, in reality, Cuban sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay was
nothing more than a legal fiction unsupported by any measure of recognized
sovereignty. 383
B. The Constitutional Approach
The Court's jurisdictional approach provides the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay
with a venue in which they could challenge their designation as enemy aliens. 38 4
While this solution addresses the immediate issue of the Prisoners' access to
federal courts, it leaves untouched the core issue regarding the extent of the Pris-
oners' rights under the Constitution. 38 5 In addition, this solution ignores the de-
liberate and methodical manner by which the Executive went about depriving
prisoners in the War on Terror from the fundamental protections which lie at the
core of our legal system and tradition.
376 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81; see also supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the history of Guantanamo Bay).
377 See supra Part H.D. 1 (noting that the lease agreement between the United States and Cuba, while
recognizing Cuban sovereignty over the territory, gave the United States complete jurisdiction and con-
trol over the territory and its affairs).
378 See Eddie Dominguez, Mines Removed at Guantanamo Base, AP, para. 1-2 (Jan. 17, 1998), http://
www.cubanet.org/CNews/y98/jan98/17e6.htm.
379 Id. at para. 4 (noting that the naval base at Guantanamo Bay is surrounded by 4,000 Cuban soldiers
and protected from within by only 400 Marines).
380 Neuman, supra note 136, at 39.
381 Id. at 43.
382 Id. at 43-44.
383 See generally supra Part I.D. 1. This approach has support in recent case law. The Ninth Circuit
in Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cit. 2003), reversed and remanded, 542 U.S. 952 (2004), vacated
and remanded to the Ninth Circuit forfurther consideration, followed the same logic. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that even if Guantanamo Bay was not considered within U.S. sovereign territory, it must be
considered within U.S. territorial jurisdiction by virtue of the level of control the United States exercised
over it. Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1299. The court then relied on Braden to find that the jurisdictional limita-
tion in § 2241(a) allowed federal court authority to be found based on jurisdiction over the custodian. Id.
at 1301.
384 Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1301.
385 The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, supra note 328, at 400 ("Justice Stevens did not
take a position on whether his statutory holding was also constitutionally compelled...").
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Some of our nation's core values were expressed by our founding fathers in
the Declaration of Independence. 386 Our founding fathers recognized that there
are certain rights that transcend national borders or ethnicity, including the right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 387 Thus, it would seem logical that
these ideals would also be reflected in the Constitution. It is the Constitution that
limits actions of the federal government that could potentially infringe upon these
inherent rights. Indeed, the Bill of Rights contains an enumeration of the limita-
tions the drafters of the Constitution imposed on the federal government. Among
these limitations are the mandates of the Fifth Amendment.
Unlike any other right included in the Bill of Rights, the Fifth Amendment
extends its mandate to "any person. '388 It requires that no person will be tried on
a capital or "infamous" crime without being indicted by a grand jury, except in
cases arising in the military during times of war or public danger.389 It also
protects any person from being tried for the same crime twice and from being
compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence at a criminal trial. 390 It further
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.39 1 Lastly, it protects private property from public use without
just compensation. 392
Because the Constitution operates as a limit on federal government authority,
it would seem reasonable to conclude that the instructions of the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibit the government from undertaking any action that would deny those
enumerated rights to any person. Indeed, this conclusion formed the basis of
Justice Black's dissenting opinion and the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisen-
trager.393 Both Justice Black and the D.C. Circuit relied on the fact that the
protections of the Fifth Amendment required only one thing: action by the federal
government. 394 Fifth Amendment protections are triggered by such action to
protect any person affected. As such, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that because the
prisoners in Eisentrager were captured, tried, convicted, and incarcerated by the
386 See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), available at http://www.archives.
gov/national-archives-experience/charters/declaration transcript.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
387 Id. at para. 2. The Declaration of Independence states, in relevant part:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness.-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the govemed,-That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Id. (emphasis added).
388 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
389 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
390 Id.
391 ld.
392 Id.
393 See supra Part II.B.2 (ii) (discussing the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisentrager); see also supra Part
II.B.2 (iv) (discussing Justice Black's dissenting opinion).
394 See supra Part lI.B.2 (ii) (discussing the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Eisentrager); see also supra Part
II.B.2 (iv) (discussing Justice Black's dissenting opinion).
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military, the requisite nexus to trigger the protections of the Fifth Amendment
was present. Thus, the court concluded that the prisoners could invoke the
Habeas Statute to challenge their detention as a violation of due process.
Of course, this view was expressly rejected by the Court where Justice Jack-
son's majority opinion made clear that the Fifth Amendment did not have such a
broad scope. Justice Jackson reasoned that if the Fifth Amendment was given
such a broad scope, the other protections of the Bill of Rights would also extend
to the Eisentrager prisoners and all enemy aliens in any theater of war. In partic-
ular, Justice Jackson expressly referenced the First Amendment's right to free-
dom of speech, press, and assembly; the Second Amendment's right to bear
arms; the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizure; the Fifth Amendment's right to indictment by a grand jury; and the Sixth
Amendment's right to trial by jury.3 9 5
However, both the Court's later decision in Verdugo-Urquidez and the express
language of the Constitution bring into question the continued vitality of Justice
Jackson's approach. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court determined that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to aliens subject to official action outside the territorial
jurisdictions of the United States. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted that
the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments restricted their protections to "the
people." The Court reasoned that such a term implied a national connection with
the United States that a nonresident alien, subject to official action outside of the
United States, does not have. In other words, the Court interpreted the term "the
people" to limit the application of the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments to
persons with sufficient connection to the United States.
Furthermore, while the language of the Sixth Amendment confers the right to
a jury in a criminal prosecution, it also calls for jurists to be selected from the
state or a district previously defined by law wherein the crime was committed.
The clear implication of these selection criteria is that the drafters of the Sixth
Amendment did not intend its protections to extend outside the United States.
Thus, contrary to Justice Jackson's conclusion, the First, Second, Fourth, and
Sixth Amendments have no application to aliens without a national connection to
the United States.
Moreover, unlike the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, the plain lan-
guage of the Fifth Amendment indicates that its protections will extend to any
person. In this regard, it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment does not distin-
guish between citizens and aliens or between resident and nonresident aliens
when imposing its limitations on government action. Furthermore, this interpre-
tation comports with the intent expressed in the Declaration of Independence
which recognizes that the right to life, liberty, and happiness are inalienable
rights guaranteed to "all persons" without regard to citizenship. No other right
has been expressed in such an expansive way in the Declaration of Independence.
Thus, despite Justice Jackson's finding, the only reasonable conclusion is that the
Fifth Amendment requires only government action to trigger its protections, and
395 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Justice
Jackson's majority opinion).
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is intended to apply to aliens and citizens alike as impliedly stated in the
Constitution.
Justice Jackson's innate fear that such application would hinder the govern-
ment' s efforts in times of war is not without merit.396 Indeed, one cannot reason-
ably consider the text of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence
without regard to the practical realities facing our nation. Nor can one reasona-
bly argue that the myriad of constitutional protections afforded to American citi-
zens should be extended to our declared enemies. However, the judicial process
exists as an independent check on the actions of the other branches of govern-
ment to ensure that the principles upon which this nation was founded do not
give way to expediency. There must be a framework through which the courts
could fulfill this independent role by balancing the government's interest in the
public good with the liberty interest of individuals protected by the Fifth
Amendment.
Although the scope of substantive due process afforded to aliens outside U.S.
territorial jurisdiction must be developed over time, the Court has already deter-
mined that the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge397 is sufficient to balance
these competing interests. 398 In Mathews, the Court determined that procedural
due process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments imposed constraints on the
government when depriving an individual of a protected right.399 The Court fur-
ther found that the government must provide the individual with some form of a
hearing before depriving him or her of such a right.4°° In determining the scope
of this protection, the Court reasoned that three factors must be balanced: (1) the
individual interest at stake,40 1 (2) the fairness and adequacy of existing proce-
dures and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, 40 2 and (3) the
public interest at stake. 40 3 For example, in a theater of war, the fairness and
adequacy of procedures would likely be evaluated from the prospective of mili-
tary exigency, and the public interest at stake would likely be at its maximum.
Indeed, Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Eisentrager called for exactly such
an approach.
Perhaps a better approach would be to adopt Justice Kennedy's reasoning in
his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez. Justice Kennedy concluded that
396 See infra Part ll.B.2 (discussing Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Eisentrager).
397 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
398 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). The Court relied on Mathews to conclude that
a U.S. citizen was entitled to the protections of due process despite the government's compelling interest
in securing the nation.
399 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.").
400 Id. ("The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even
though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our
society.").
401 Id. at 341 (noting that the length of deprivation is also a factor in the private interest at stake).
402 Id. at 343.
403 Id. at 347-48 (stating that the financial costs alone are not determinative of the public interest, but
they are a factor to consider).
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there was no express textual limitation on the scope of the Bill of the Rights, and
elected, instead, to rely on a contextual analysis of the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause to determine the extraterritorial scope of constitutional rights. Im-
plicit in Justice Kennedy's conclusion is that the due process clause is applicable
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The only question to be
resolved, then, is the scope of constitutional protections when procedural viola-
tions are alleged in cases involving overseas government action. Such approach
would focus judicial attention not on whether the due process clause is applicable
in a particular situation, which is assumed to apply in all situations, but rather on
the much more substantive question of what exactly does due process mean
within the circumstances of individual cases. The powerful simplicity of this
approach, in comparison to the Mathews balancing test, is even more amplified in
cases originating in Guantanamo Bay, which the Court has already concluded to
be within U.S. territorial jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Rasul Court should have expressly overruled part of its
reasoning in Eisentrager and found that aliens, even enemy aliens, affected by
federal government action are protected by the Fifth Amendment. At the same
time, the Court could have preserved the ultimate conclusion in Eisentrager by
finding that, although the prisoners had cognizable rights under the Constitution
which would support their challenge under § 2241(c)(3), no due process violation
existed. This result would be supported by the fact that (1) there were adequate
procedural safeguards in the case, given a properly constituted military tribunal
to consider the charges, (2) there were sufficient mechanisms to review the tribu-
nal's conviction of the prisoners, and (3) there were no claimed violations of the
Geneva Convention. Admittedly, these findings directly implicate the merits of
the prisoners' claims in Eisentrager. However, the fact that the Eisentrager
Court based its conclusion on the merits of the case necessitates such an
approach.
By taking this approach, however, the Rasul Court would have determined
once and for all that the Constitution stands above all three branches of govern-
ment, and that its power and effectiveness is not beholden to the ingenuity of the
Executive in devising schemes to circumvent it. Furthermore, the Court would
have provided clear guidance to the lower courts to determine the extent of the
prisoners' rights in the case.
V. Impact
By adopting the jurisdictional approach to resolving the prisoners' rights to a
habeas appeal, the Court addressed only the initial question of the prisoners' right
to access federal courts. However, without clarifying exactly what rights the
prisoners have, the lower courts are left without any guidance as to whether there
is actually any violation of the Constitution or U.S. law if prisoners are detained
indefinitely and without trial at Guantanamo Bay. 4 ° 4 This will unavoidably cre-
404 See generally Nat Hentoff, More Lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay, DUNKIN DAILY DEMOCRAT
(Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.dddnews.com/story/108171.htm ("'Guantanamo remains a legal black
hole."').
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ate confusion in the lower courts and result in conflicting opinions on a threshold
matter that the Court could have easily resolved in Rasul.
For example, in In re Guantanamo Detainees, Judge Green found that "[t]here
would be nothing impracticable and anomalous in recognizing that the detainees
at Guantanamo Bay have the fundamental right to due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment. '40 5 Yet, Judge Leon in the same court concluded that Rasul
did not confer on the Guantanamo detainees any substantive rights and was, in-
stead, limited to whether these detainees had a right to judicial review of the
legality of their detention under the Habeas Statute.40 6 Judge Leon then found
that the detainees had no substantive rights,40 7 effectively limiting their rights
under Rasul to simply filing papers with courts to raise claims that are bound to
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,40 8 which is currently under consideration by the
Court, the Court once again has an opportunity to address the substantive issues
that it avoided in Rasul. In Hamdan, the petitioner was denied the limited right
for review of his status as an enemy combatant that Eisentrager held he is enti-
tled to. He was detained in Guantanamo Bay without a hearing by any compe-
tent tribunal or the opportunity to effectively contest his designation as an enemy
combatant. 40 9 In his continuing trial for war crimes by a military commission,
the petitioner was denied the rights and protections of the Geneva Convention
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War on the Executive's unre-
viewed finding that the Convention does not apply to the petitioner or other simi-
larly situated detainees. In essence, the Executive asserted the sole and exclusive
authority to determine whether the detainees are subject to international treaties,
what criminal process they will face, 4 10 what rights they will have,4 11 who will
judge them,41 2 how they will be judged,4 13 upon what crimes they will be sen-
tenced,414 and how the sentence will be carried out.415 Nothing in the Constitu-
tion gives the Executive such complete and unfettered authority over the life,
405 In re Guantanamo Detainees, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465 (D.D.C. 2005).
406 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (D.D.C. 2005).
407 Id.
408 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (2005), cert. granted by 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
409 Id. at 35.
410 See Dep't of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 (Revised), § 11 (Aug. 31, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) [herein-
after MCO No. 1]. The President formed a military commission for the sole purpose of trying the
Hamdan petitioner and other similarly situated detainees.
411 Id. § 6D. For example, the Military Commission adopts neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor
the Military Rules of Evidence, which have been painstakingly developed through decades of experience
and public comment. Instead, the Commission's only rule governing, for example, admissibility of evi-
dence is the arbitrary "probative value to a reasonable person" standard. Id. The Commission also has no
prohibition on admissibility of evidence obtained by torture or unlawful coercion.
412 Id. § 6H(4). The Executive can appoint and remove members of the Military Commission's panel
as well as members of the panel that was designed to review the final judgment of the Military Commis-
sion. Id.
413 Id. § 3.
414 Id.
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liberty, or property of a human being, alien or citizen, within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States. 4 16
The Supreme Court also missed an opportunity to define the Guantanamo de-
tainees' rights under the Constitution before Congress essentially suspended the
detainee's right for the writ of habeas corpus in December 2005. 4 17 Unless the
Court determines the issue in Hamdan, the detainees are likely to remain de-
prived of their freedom without an understanding of exactly what crimes they
committed or an opportunity to hear and rebut the evidence against them in a
competent and independent forum. Sadly, the process now afforded to the de-
tainees is defined in terms over which the United States has consistently criti-
cized other countries. 4 18
VI. Conclusion
If the events surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq reveal anything, it is
that the Executive is incapable of creating sufficient internal checks and balances
to ensure that the rule of law, which is deeply rooted in our nation's conscious-
ness, is followed. 419 There is no dispute that the War on Terror has been thrust
upon us because of the senseless death of thousands of our fellow Americans.
There is also no dispute that we are justified in taking all reasonable measures to
protect ourselves following this act of barbarism. However, the moral righteous-
ness of our cause is measured not only by the purity of our objectives but also by
the means we use to achieve them. While expediency and convenience can be
helpful in addressing our short-term objectives of catching those who would
415 Id. §§ 6H(2)-(4). The President has sole and exclusive authority to accept, reject, or modify the
findings of the commission. Id.
416 See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1949). Even in Quirin where the Supreme Court
affirmed the President's authority to have such unfettered authority over the lives of enemy combatants
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, this authority was limited by the Quirin prisoners
undisputed status as enemy combatants. Id. at 7. In Hamdan, the petitioner's status as an enemy combat-
ant was disputed, and the dispute was never resolved by a competent tribunal.
417 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). Section
1005(e)(1) of that Act amends the habeas statute to provide that "no court, Justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider" any action filed by or on behalf of an alien held in Military custody at
Guantanamo Bay for a writ of habeas corpus or any other form of relief, except pursuant to Exclusive
statutory review procedures established by the Act. Id. at § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2741. The Act further
states that this provision "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act." Id. at § 1005(h)(1),
119 Stat. 2743.
418 See U.S. State Dep't, Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000, available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). The State Department criti-
cized Egypt's use of military courts to try defendants accused of terrorism. Id. The report stated that
Egypt's military courts have "deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be
tried by a civilian judge." Id. It went on to criticize the military courts' lack of independence, noting that
they "do not ensure civilian defendants due process before an independent tribunal" since military judges
are appointed by the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline. Id.
419 See T.A. Badge, Soldier Gets 10 years for Iraq prison abuse, DET. NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at IA;
see also Pasiley Dodds, FBI letter on Guantanamo Says Army Told of Abuses, VErTRA CouYrrv STAR
(Cal.), Dec. 7, 2004, at 10; (noting that the FBI may have warned the Pentagon about physical abuse and
"aggressive" interrogation methods of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay more than a year before the
prison abuse scandal in Iraq broke); see also Paisley Dodds, Special Forces Accused of Pressuring
Others, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Cal.), Dec. 8, 2004, at 12.
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wage war against us, it cannot and must not be the controlling factor in our
decision-making process. Instead, fortitude and perseverance must be at the core
of our efforts to root out those who would seek to harm us and those who have
already inflicted unimaginable pain upon us.
The Rasul Court's decision made clear that the Judiciary will not abdicate its
duty as an independent check on the actions of the Executive and the Legislature
in their prosecution of the War on Terror. It also made clear that, while we will
remain resolute in defending our nation and our way of life, we will not do so at
the expense of who we are. We are a nation of laws that represent the values and
morals that make us Americans, and our democratically-elected government is
the political and legal embodiment of these laws. Our government's actions,
whether in the national or international arenas, are a reflection of these laws and,
as such, the limits that we place upon these actions are a reflection of our nation's
ideals. It is foolhardy to believe that the Executive derives its power from these
laws and, at the same time, insist that the Executive can act completely uncon-
strained simply because such action would occur outside of our physical bor-
ders. 420 As former British Prime Minister William Pitt said in a speech before
the House of Common on November 18, 1783: "Necessity is the plea for every
infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of
slaves." 421
420 See generally supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Eisentrager opinion); see also supra Part III.C
(discussing the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion in Rasul). There is no dispute that indefinite
detention and total denial of access to an independent tribunal would be unlawful if it occurred within the
United States. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795-96 (1950). While there is no
serious argument that nonresident aliens should be afforded the protection of the entire Bill of Rights, it
is illogical to believe that they do not have any protections at all against actions by the Executive. Id. at
796-97.
421 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 412 (Emily Morison Beck ed., Little, Brown, & Company
1980) (1855).
Volume 3, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 83
